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Case No. 7960 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of. the 
STATE OF UTAH 
_A_LLEN BECK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RI-IODES JEPPESEN, d. b. a. 
JEPPESEN POTATO CHIP COM-
AXY, and OZIAS HARVEY HAR-
'VARD, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a collision between a 1947 Dodge 
Coupe owned and driven by the plaintiff and a small 
1946 Dodge delivery truck with a van type body, owned 
by defendant, Rhodes Jeppesen and used in his potato 
chip business and which truck was being driven by 
defendant, Ozias Harvey Harward, at the time of the 
collision. The collision occurred on the 23rd day of 
May, 1952 at about the hour of 6:00 P.M. or in the early 
evening while it was still daylight. (R. 8, 10). The 
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scene of the collision "Tas at an intersection of t"To 
alleys \V hich "~ere located in the middle of the block 
occupied by and in the rear of the Para1nount Theater, 
l(eeleys Ice Cream Store, the Naylor Automobile 
Company and the Provo City Bakery. This block is 
located in the center of the business distriet in Provo 
City, Utah. The \Vest to east alley started at the rear 
of certain uniden ti:fied buildings on the \Yest side of 
the block (see plaintiff's exhibit "C" looking to tile 
\vest past the rear of the Paran1ount Theater), and 
\vent eastward past the rear of the Pararnount Theater 
on the south crossing then the south to north alley and 
proceeding along the south side of the Provo City 
Bakery, then proceeding to First East Street on the 
east side of the block (see plaintiff's exhibit "A" 
looking to the east, showing the bakery on the left, and 
First East Street in the background). The south to 
north alley started in the rear of Keeleys Ice Crean1 
Store, proceeded on the east side of the Para1nount 
Theater, crossed the \vest to east alley, passed the rear 
of the Provo City Bakery on the east then past the 
Naylor Automobile Company on the west and pro-
ceeded out onto University street on the north. (plain-
tiff's exhibit "B" showing rear of Bakery on right 
and Naylor Automobile Company on the left and exit to 
University street. (R. 16, 17). The plaintiff drove 
his automobile from the west toward the east (R. 18) 
along the rear of the Paramount Theater which would 
be on his right side (R. 10). 
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As he drove along from the 'vest he traveled about ~-
three feet aw·ay fron1 the north side of the Paramount 
building. (R. 18-19). The plaintiff had been parked 
and had traveled about 60 to 75 feet before he came 
to the east corner of the Paramount Building (R. 18.) 
The defendants had parked in the rear of Keeleys 
Store, had made a delivery and were driving to the 
north along the east side of the Paramount theater at 
about 3 to 8 feet away from the Paramount Building. 
(R. 34, 49.) The defendants had traveled from where 
they were parked about the .length of a car (R. 49). 
l(eeleys Store 'vas about 60 feet back from the inter-
section (R. 20). These alleys are about 12 feet wide. 
(R. 49) The intersection measures obliquely from the 
southwest corner to the northeast corner about 18 feet 
(R. 21). The collision occurred when the automobiles 
of the plaintiff and the defendant Jeppesen, came upon 
each other around the corner of the Paramount theater 
building which is about '60 feet high (R. 12). Opposite 
the Paramount Theater building to the north is an open 
space in back of the Naylor Automobile Company. (see 
plaintiff's exhibit "B" and ''C".) ,Opposite the Para-
mount theater building to the east is also an open park-
ing lot. (R. 11). 
In the plaintiff's own words and by his own wit-
nesses the plaintiff was leaving this enclosed area by 
way of the west to east alley and was going east past 
the Paramount building approaching the intersection 
above referred to. He claims he was going about ten 
miles per hour (R. 20) and had half of his automobile 
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out past the coi·ner of the Pararnount building (R. :21) 
\\Then he savv the defendant's truck for the first ti1ne. It 
\Vas then about 25 feet do\vn the other alley to the 
south. (R. 12, 19, 20). Plaintiff then slan1n1ed on his 
brakes and claims the defendants' truck hit his anto-
Inobile on the right side just back of the right front 
fender causing plaintiff to go to the left and into a 
telephone pole on the south\vest corner of the ProvrJ 
Bakery. (see plaintiff's exhibit "£\"). (R. 12). Plain-
tiff did not kno\Y the defendants' speed (R. 20, 22). 
The plain tiff claims his dan1age \vas to his car just 
back of the right front fender, right door and right 
rear fender and then after hitting the telephone pole 
the left front of the autornobile ''7 as further da1naged. 
(R. 13, 27) including the left front tire, the grill, head-
light and bumper. The length of the plaintiff's car 
\vas about 15 feet (R. 21, 35). After the ilnpact the left 
front end of the plaintiff's car was resting against 
the telephone pole and the nose of the defendants' truck 
\Vas about even with the north or rear end of the Para-
mount building. (R. 35, 36, 47). There is a dispute, 
however, as to whether the defendant's truck had been 
1noved after the impact. 
The defendants' version of the accident as revealed 
by the evidence of both defendants vvas to the effect 
that both defendants, Mr. Jeppesen as the owner of the 
,Jeppesen Potato Chip Company, and Mr. llarward, as 
driver of the Jeppesen truck, had gone to the rear 
of Keeleys Ice Cream Store to deliver potato chip~. 
The defendants truck had been parked facing north in 
the parking area to the east of the Paran1ount build-
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ing, uext to the allPy. That after rnaking the delivery 
the driYcr Lacked up slightly to the south enough to 
clear a post and then proceeded to drive north in the 
south to north alley along the. east side of the Para-
Inount building to\Yarcl the intersection in question. 
(R. 48, 49, 56, 37). The truck was traveling out from 
the Paramount building about 8 feet, (R. 49). The 
truck still in len\,. gea1, had covered at about 3 to 5 miles 
per hour (R. 51, 3-±) about its own length from where 
it "\Yas parked "~hen the nose of the defendants' truck 
got about 2 feet beyond the north edge of the Para-
mount building, when the defendant driver, noticed the 
plaintiff's automobile approaching from the west (R. 
49, 59). The defendant driver stopped immediately 
just as the plaintiff went past scrubbing the entire 
length of the plaintiff's car on its right side from the 
front fender back. The pliantiff's automobile then went 
on at an angle and hit head on into the telephone pole. 
(R. 49, 50). The defendants maintain the defendants' 
truck remained in that position throughout the inves-
tigation and was not moved (R. 50). The defendants 
estimate that plaintiff's speed at a "pretty good speed" 
or around 25 miles per hour (R. 51). From the point 
of impact to the pole hit by the plaintiff is about 15 
to 16 feet. (R. 53). Defendant Jeppesen also remembered 
traveling just the length of the truck, barely getting -
started before arriving at the corner. He roughly puts 
the plaintiff's automobile about 30 to 40 feet away. 
(R. 57) just as the truck stopped and that the plain-
tiff going at 30 to 40 miles per hour collided with the 
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front end of the defendants' truck. (R .. 58) The de-
fendants truck had been narked in the area east of the 
.t 
I)aramount building. This space allo\ved for t"~o 
rows of cars at slight angles off north and south facing 
each other. The rear end of the north ro\Y can1e out 
even \vith the north edge of the Paran1ount building. 
rrhe defendants had parked in the last space on the 
\vest end of the south rovv of cars and after the delivery 
to Keeleys had just backed up a little to get by a 
post and then proceeded north down the alley. (R. 49-50). 
The plaintiff tr1ed to empha~ize the fact that the 
defendants ran into his autoinobile hitting it somewhere 
back of the right front fender. (R. 12). The defendants 
dispute this clai::.n and state the defendants' truck was 
stopped on impact (R. 50, 63, 65) and that the plain-
tiffs automobile ''scrubbed'' or side-s,viped the front 
bumper only, (R. 49, 52, 53, 65) and that only the 
1narks on the defendants' truck \Vere on the bumper. 
(R. 53). The fact that the extended bumper on the 
plaintiff's car was not 1narked or damaged is explainea 
by the fact that the bun1per on the defendant's truck 
is higher than the plaintiff's bumper. (R. 71, 72). We 
feel that the plaintiff is bound by the testimony of his 
ovvn witness, l\1r. I-Iale, \vho was service manager to 
the Naylor Au ton1obile Co. lie ren1embered the plain-
tiff's automobile and the dan1age caused in the acci-
dent in question. (R. 37, 38). He testified that the 
damage to the plaintiff's right front fender was all 
~long the side, to the point of damaging the nickel 
shield that sets over the sealed head light on the said 
right front fender, and it started from the front bun1per 
and went right back. (R. 38, 42, 44, 45.) 
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STATEl\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. The plaintiff's evidence was insuffi-
cient to support a finding of the Court that the defend-
ants were negligent. 
POINT II. The plaintiff's evidenve was insufficient 
to support the court's. decision that the defendants' 
negligence, if any, 'vas the proxin1ate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. 
POINT III. The Court erred in not finding as a . 
matter of la'v and frorn the facts put in evidence that 
the plaintiff vvas contributorily negligent and that the 
said contributory negligence· of the plaintiff precludes 
him from recovery. ·Especially due to the fact that 
the defendants came into the intersection on the right 
of the plainiff and had the right of way. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT. 
II. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S DECISION THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, WAS THE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Under the theory -of the plaintiff's own case we 
respectfully submit that ·these points are the highlights 
of the evidence in this case : 
1. That plaintiff's automobile traveling ·east arrived 
at a point about halfway or about 1/3 across the inter-
section before he even saw the defendants' truck. Note 
the 12 foot lanes and small intersection and his state-
ment that half of his car got past the corner (R. 21.) 
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2. At that point the defendants' truck "''as about 
25 feet to the south do'.\~n the other alley and that except 
for the fact that plainiff slan11ned on his brakes he 
nevertheless continued n1oving right on past and into 
the pole. ( R. 12). 
3. The defendants' had barely moved the length 
or less of their truck at that point and were just starting 
to move from a standing position. 
4. That the plaintiff was traveling at a much higher 
rate of speed than the defendants. Please note the 
absence of damage to the defendants' truck and the 
extreme damage to the plaintiff's automobile, including 
a damaged tire and heavy front end damage before 
it came to a stop rrfter the collision with the defendants' 
truck and skidding about five feet into the pole. (R. 
13, 26). 
The defendants' respectfully submit that such a 
set of facts creates no ·case of negligence against the 
defendants. There is no charge, or evidence of speed, 
ngainst the defendants, no evidence of lack of control 
or doing anything that the ordinary, prudent person 
'vouldn 't do or have done in approaching an intersection 
of that type. The defendant driver had to get the nose 
of his car a.t least t'vo feet out in such a case to see if 
any car was even coining; the plaintiff had a right 
to assume that other drivers would approach such inter-
sections at a careful rate as contemplated by law and 
not at the hjgh rate of speed undoubtedly traveled 
by the plaintiff. We submit that the plaintiff n1ust pro-
duce a case that is ·consistent, that must be convincing 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden is on the 
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plaintiff to pro\·l\ such n en~e. .,,, e sub1nit it is in1pos-
sible for the plaintiff to be over one-third of the way 
across that intersection traveling at speeds which -vvc>rc 
far in excess of that of the defendants and not be far 
past the intersection by the time the defendants had 
traveled the 23 feet. By the plaintiff's own testimony 
he \vas into the intersection 7 or 8 feet and only had 
about 11 feet to clL~ar it (R. 21). The defendants had to 
go 23 feet nnd "~ere at a much lo,ve1· speed. We submit 
this does not prove his case and therefore respectfully 
repeat that under the evidence submitted by the plain-
tiff there is no proof of negligence on. the part of the 
defendants and therefore the plaintiff's damage and 
,injuries \\'ere not caused by any negligent acts of the 
defendants. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NO·T FINDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW AND FROM THE FACTS PUT IN EVIDENCE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AND THA-T SAID CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
OF THE PLAINTIFF PRECLUDES HIM FROM RECOVERY. 
ESPECIALLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE DEFEND-
ANTS CAME INTO THE INTERSECTION ON THE RIGHT 
OF THE PLAINTIFF AND HAD THE RIGI-IT OF WAY. 
The defendants respectfully submit that regardless 
of what attitude this court might take as to the presence 
or lack of negligence on the part of the defendants or 
vYhether this court deems it proper to even disturb that 
phase of this decision, defendants maintain that the 
plaintiff in this case does not come into Court with clean 
hands and that he -vvas guilty of contributory negligence 
'vhich we claim was the sole and proximate cause of the 
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plaintiff's damage and injuries or "·a~ at lea~t a definite 
and outstanding contributory cause thereto. One is 
almost inclined to apologize for asking the court to 
again review this perpetual problem. It has been solved 
by many previous cases out of this court and as here, 
new sets of facts in future cases 'viii no doubt result -in 
this court being called upon to apply the rule to, and 
untangle the facts of, many cases to con1e. 
We come before this court, therefore, insisting that 
there is negligence which can be imputed to the plaintiff 
and that said negligence on the plain tiff's part was 
either the sole cause of the plaintiff's losses or was a 
concurring and contributory factor thereto. 
After all, a collision did occur in this case. There-
fore, under the circumstances involved here, where an 
accident occurs in a space of about 12 feet by 12 feet, 
of necessity both cars are going to have to be there at 
about the same time. Defendants again, therefore, urge 
that the plaintiff's version cannot be consistent when 
it is clear that the plaintiff was traveling much faster 
than the defendants and when plaintiff claims he was 
about half to one-third through the intersection the de-
fendants were still a car length away and yet a collision 
occurred. It would have to be maintained that defendant~ 
\Vere traveling at a speed almost double that of plain-
tiff. The other facts in the record will not support such 
conclusions. The defendants stopped almost, if not ex-
actly on the point of impact. The plaintiff's car, after 
that impact could not have ·been, and was not thrown 
over 2 or 3 feet off course to hit the pole on the left 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
front end of plaintiff's auton1obile. (See plaintiff's ex-
hibit H..._\,''). A great impact caused by any great speed 
on defendants' part vvould have netted entirely different 
results. The plaintiff had no idea how fast the defendants 
"'ere goin and 1nade no claim in the record of any speed 
on defendants' part. (R. 20.) 
Defendants, therefore, submit that the defendants 
theory of this case n1uch more accurately represents 
\vhat actually happened. Again, we submit that both 
autmobiles entered the intersection at about the same 
instant. The defendants' ·claim their truck entered first 
and then stopped, but the plaintiff going faster, then 
entered, brushed the defendants truck's bumper and 
the collision resulted. It was certainly all confined to the 
smallest in time and space so that a definite determina-
tion as to who entered the intersection first, taking 
into consideration the plaintiff's greater speed, could 
at best be figured only in fractions of feet and seconds, 
if at all. 
Defendants' charge the plaintiff with negligence 
which was at least the ·contributing cause of his damage 
and injuries if not the sole and proximate cause, and 
that negligence being as follows : 
1. For traveling at an excessive rate of speed that 
\Yas not reasonable and prudent under the conditions 
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing and failing to keep proper control so as to 
avoid colliding with other vehicles. (Section 41-6-46, 
Utah ode Annotated 1953.) 
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~. For failure to yield the right of \Yay to a Yehicle 
entering an intersection on the right when both vehicles 
entered said intersection at the same time. (Section 
·11-'6-72, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) 
3. For failure to be just a little more cautious than 
norn1ally expected because of the lack of sight distance 
and confined circumstances \vhere this accident occurred. 
Speaking of contributory negligence as the proxi-
Inate cause of losses in any accident, this honorable court 
i:n the case of Hess vs. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2d at page 510 
and 511, 109 Utah 60 states as follo\vs: 
":B-,or plain tiff's negligence to be a defense 
for the defendant, it must not only exist at the 
same time and place as conditions created or the 
forces put in operation by the negligence of 
defendants, but it must set in operation a force, 
or create a condition, which had a share in pro-
ducing the injury. Proximate cause of an injury 
means that the injury was the natural and prob-
able consequence of the negligence and such as 
ought to have been foreseen in the light of attend-
ing circurnstances, that is a consequ.ence which a 
person of ordinary foresight and pruaence would 
have anticipated.'' 
"It is one that directly causes or contributes 
directly to causing the result. It must be such 
action that a person of ordinary caution and pru-
dence would have foreseen that some inj\lry would 
likely result therefrorn. The nearest independent 
cause which is adequate to and does bring about 
an injury is the proximate cause thereof." 
''Where an act is one which a person in the 
exercise of ordinary care could have anticipated 
as likely to result in injury, then he is liable for 
any injury actually resulting from it, although 
he could not have anticipated the particular in-
jury which did occur. ' ' 
I 
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In the ca8e of' Jlart·in vs. Stevens1 243 Pae. ·2d. 747, 
750-51, the most recent expression of this court, the ques-
tion of right of way was very ably discussed. It charged 
all drivers with the duty of ''due care,'' but also pointed 
out that to avoid uncertainty and confusion at intersec-
tions certain rules had been laid down 'to expedite inter-
section traffic consistent with safety. One rules is that. 
\Vhere a person clearly gets into an intersection first, he 
has the right of way, and all others must respect it, then 
the court proceeded to discuss the problem further as 
follo\VS': 
''In close cases, this test is somewhat unsatis-
factory because of the 9-ifficulties, after a collision 
has occurred, of determining who had the right of 
way on that basis. The text just referred to cor-
. rectly states : '* * * * The mere fact of reaching 
the intersection first is no longer recognized as 
the sole test as to who has the right of way.' In 
order for a driver to clai1n the right of way on 
the basis of entering the intersection first, it must 
appear that he did not speed up just for the pu.i.--
pose of claiming the right of way, and also that 
the margin of distance by which he claimed it was 
so clear as to be without doubt.'' 
''The second rule is ·easier to apply and there-
fore more satisfactory, that is: When vehicles 
are approaching and about to enter the intersec-
tion at substantially the same time, the driver 
approaching from the right has the right of way 
over the one approaching from his left. The same 
text says : 'This rule has been called the basic 
lavv governing operation of vehicles at street 
intersections.' Necessity dictates that this rule 
govern unless one vehicle is enoungh ahead of the 
other in entering the intersection to assure him a 
clear ·margin of safety." 
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' ' even if doubt had arisen, then that is the very 
circumstance in 'vhich the rule of the driver ap-
proaching fron1 the right governs. Plaintiff also 
had the right of "\\7ay on that ground.'' 
"Although plaintiff had the right of way 
under both rules above referred to, yet there de-
volved upon him the duty of due care in observing 
for other traffic. But in doing so he had the right 
to assume and to rely and act on the assump-
tion that ~thers would do likewise ; he was not 
obliged to anticipate either that other drivers 
would drive negligently, nor fail to accord him 
his right of way, until in the exercise of due care, 
be observed, or should have observed, something 
to warn him that the other driver was driving 
negligently or would fail to accord him his right 
of way.'' 
In the case of Bulloch vs. LukeJ 98 Pac. 2d. 350, 98 
Utah 501, at page 352, this court dealing with another 
intersection case well known to all of us, states: 
''Ordinarily the driver on the right may pre-
sume that the one on the left will afford him the 
right of way; and that presumption will remain 
with him until such time as a reasonably prudent 
person will realize that the driver on the left is 
not going to afford him that right." 
We submit that there is no evidence that the plain-
tiff slowed down to check his safety around the Para-
Elount Theater corner. The defendants, at least were 
able to stop before going through the intersection even 
though there might be some question as to how far the 
defendants got past the Paramount building but it 
couldn't be far. The undisputed evidence was that the 
front bumper was merely scratched and then not enough 
to hurt it. If the defendants had got out into the alley 
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haYe be12n hit broaLh_.;idl• or the plaintiff \Youlcl have been 
forced out of tl1e allL·y. Note that the plaintiff stayed 
~- tbstantially in the alley and hit his left front corner 
on the pole. These facts seem to the defendants to make 
it unimportant \Yhether the defendants automobile was 
pulled back or knocked back to the final position of 
being even \Yith the Pararnount building if the testimony 
of their witness, Hughes, and the plaintiff in that respect 
is true. ( R. 35, 36, 47.) We do not doubt the possibility 
of such a condition under these circumstances. No doubt 
the plaintiff did look for cars as he came to this corner 
but it is obvious that his caution was insufficient, un-
tinlel:'" and of no effect under the plaintiff's speed and 
conclitions then prevailing. 
In Vol. II of Blashfield 's Encyclopedia of Auto-
Hlohile Law, we find the following quotations: 
~\t page 211-15, Sec. 992: 
"The rule under statute or ordinance is 
usually that the driver o f a vehicle approaching 
an intersection from the right has the right of 
way over the driver approaching from the left on 
a cross street.'' 
''This rule has been called the basic la vv gov-
erning operation of vehicles at street intersec-
tions, and it has been said that the ingrafting; 
of exceptions on to this rule is not to be favored.'' 
.1\.t page-> 225, Sec. 993: 
"Else\vhere a statute providing that, when 
t\vo vehicles approach an intersection at the san1e 
time, the vehicle approaching from the right shall 
haYe the right of way, has been held to apply 
only where the vehicles arrive at approximately 
the same time, the vvord "approach'' being con-
nny\rhen· beyond two or three feet the narro'v alley 
\rould have been blocked and either the defendants would 
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strued to 1nean that the vehicles -\Yhen about to 
arrive at the intersection must be approximately 
a like distance away from the given point, ?r at 
· least so situated that one using reasonable JUdg-
n1ent might anticipate their simultaneous arrival, 
and an ordinance in similar terms has been con-
strued iri a like manner.'' 
At page 351, Sec. 1037: 
''In view of the common traffic rule accord-
ing the right of vvay to a driver approaching 
from the right, where such regulation prevails, 
a driver is presun1ed to know that a vehicle ap-
proaching a street intersection from his right 
has the right of way, and is under the duty of 
looking to the right for automobiles approaching 
from that direction.'' 
The defendants especially refrain from burdening 
the court with citations outside our own jurisdiction be-
cause of the numerous Utah cases on intersection prob-
lon1s and the thoroughness with which it has been handled. 
\Ve do not bother to refer to or quote from all Utah 
cases. We do de sir~ to refer to the following on the 
problem of due care for all drivers at intersections and 
their application to the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. 
In Bullock vs. Luke, supra, at page 352, this Honor-
able ·Court said : 
''There is no arbitrary rule as to the time 
and place of looking for vehicles on an inter-
secting rQad, and no particular distance from the 
intersection is presecribed for that purpose. The 
general standards are that observation should 
be made at the first opportunity and at a point 
where observation will be reasonably efficient 
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observation "at the first opportunity" at a point where 
it is still safe for the driver to proceed and where the 
ear can still be safely controlled. The plaintiff allowed 
hhnself no such opportunity. According to his ovvn testi-
Inony \Yhile corning out 3 feet away from a blind corner, 
\\-ithout even slo\ving do"\vn, he looked and saw the de-
fendants for the first time. 
In the case of Hickok vs. Skinner, 190 Pac. 2d, 514, 
J17; 113 Utah 1, involving another intersection accident 
this honorable court says: 
'' * * * regardless of vvhich driver is technically 
entitled to the right of way, both operators must 
use due care and caution in proceeding into and 
across inersections. While the burden to drive so 
carefully as always to be prepared for, and to be 
able to avoid, the negligence of another should not 
be placed on either driver, there should be placed 
on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and 
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. 
:t'~ either should be permitted to close his eyes to 
other vehicles ·w··hich he ln1ov\rs or has reason to 
believe are approaching * * * '' 
"Each driver is charged with using due care 
to avoid the collision, and one cannot say when his 
ovvn negligence continues to the point of impact, 
'we "\vere both negligent, but you alone are 
chargeable because I got there first and you 
should have missed me' ". 
\Ve do not have a Utah case known to this defendant 
involving a blind corner. In fact we have ·been unable 
to find a case right in point. All cases dealing with that 
issue are blind curves and usually have t"\vo lanes for 
traffic. The present case certainly is a blind corner case. 
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Respecting such cases, Blashfield in his Encyclo-
pedia of Automobile Law (Permanent Ed.) Vol. II at 
}_)age 77, section 905, 've read as follows: 
"Drivers approaching each other at a curve 
or at blind corners so that they cannot see each 
other are under a~ increased obligation on the 
part ~f each to be on his proper side of the road, 
as in such case one is legally bound to anticipate 
that a vehicle from the opposite direction may 
at any 1noment appear." 
The law vvell supports the principle that under our 
circumstances the blind corner increased the duties on 
the part of both drivers. Again we submit that this in-
creases the care the plaintiff should have exercised and 
increases his contributory negligence. 
The rule in all curve cases are decided on the basis 
that a person must make the curve on his own side but 
so as to make it safe for persons that are coming and 
cannot be seen. It naturally follows that such situations 
create an added burden. 
A ruling symbolic of such cases is found in Pohler 
vs. Hu1nbolt Motor Stages, (Calf.) 224 Pac. 2d, 440 at 
page 442. The court says : 
"It is true that a driver approaching a curve 
is under incerased o bliga.tion to be on his proper 
side of the road and to reasonably anticipate that 
a vehicle from the opposite direction may appear 
at any moment.'' 
The defendants desire further to point out that 
'·'·~here we are dealing with an open intersection as in 
this case, where in all substantial respects there can be 
no denying that both parties arrived at the intersection 
at about the same time, and that the finger of blame 
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pointed at either because he didn't stop, didn't look or 
probably acted or failed to act in son1e other \vay, can be 
pointed out in conclusion that the above is inevitably 
flaYored \Yith the facts that: 
1. The plaintiff \Yas traYeling at a high and ex-
cessi Ye rate of ~peed as sho\vn by the facts, while the 
defendants ,,_-ere able to stop substantially at the opening 
of the intersection as sho\Yll by the evidence and the 
fact that the defendants stopped before damage resulted 
to them. 
2. That defendants had the right of \vay and plain-
tiff did not yield to that right of \vay. 
3. This intersection \Y'as a blind one and increased 
the burden en both. 
The "Intersection'' is admittedly not a high,vay 
intersection, but our la\v does not confine the rules to 
such. We maintain Section 41-6-72, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, applies. Both alleys started in the rear 
of certain buildings and continued on out to main high-
"rays or streets. Both parties hereto started on the 
blind ends and were on their way out to the streets 
when the accident happened so that both parties are 
equal in that respect. We feel the fact that this involves 
alleys in the middle of the block should not in the least 
effect the application of rules generally. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants submit that the facts of this case 
support the defendants' contention that: 
(a) The defendants were not negligent. 
(b) That defendants committed no negligent acts 
'vhich 'vcre the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries 
and damages. 
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(c) And that the plain tiff was clearly negligent and 
careless and contributed to his own injuries. That said 
eontributory negligence resulted from his excessive speed, 
failure to keep his car under control and keep a proper 
lookout, his failure to yield the right of way to the 
defendants and because of the added burden resulting 
from all these things happening at a blind corner and 
under such close circumstances. Defendants request that 
the decision of the lower court be reversed. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
C. N. OTTOSEN 
1320 Continental B~nk Building 
Salt Lake City, ·utah 
Attorney for Defendants. 
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